Correcting The Course
Solutions Come from the Correct Command
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Tactics are something you can turn on a dime,” said Richard L. Armitage, the former deputy secretary of state, and an Army veteran with close ties to the military. “Strategy takes time, and that’s the question. Do we have time for a new strategy?”
Any thoughts evaluating the formation of a new strategy cannot ignore reevaluation of the old one. The reevaluation has been consistent on all levels: The present course on Iraq is the implementation of a wrong strategy. It means the over-all rallying cry which defined the course of action “War on Terror” was being called into question. This does not mean however, that no resolution of the present Iraq conflict is possible as we will learn later.
In the frontlines, The value placed on issuing the correct course of action cannot be underestimated. Victory or defeat – giving the enemy unnecessary advantage and the unnecessary loss of lives of one’s own troops all hang in a balance when the simple order of “Attack!” or “Retreat! “ is given, and although there is often no admission of “retreat” (or cut and run) since troop morale is always kept high, even in the ranks of enemy insurgents, “retreat” is a very valid and correct strategy. The reason a lot of discussion is given to even defining the Commander’s intent is because of the caution exercised in ensuring that the cascade of sub-commands that will follow will really implement the correctly interpreted strategy that will lead to victory.
So the burden for the Commander to spell out the correct course of action is rather great,
but what about “War on Terror” as the strategic course of action?
The Consequences of a Wrong Strategy
The question on “War on Terror” is its broadness. Sure, there was the obvious need not to glorify the terrorists as well as avoid the confusion that could ensue by giving the strategy a religious overtone, so “War on Terror” seemed the safest to use at the time, but, carelessly crafted as it was, did it define the enemy well enough so as not to confuse it with the Moslem world within which it wanted to hide? Also, the enemy, as it had shown in previous patterns of military offensives, was intent on carrying out guerilla warfare on targets of opportunity in the world. In giving out the strategic course, how could the Commander spell out the most effective response to defeat a global unconventional war ? Clearly, the “War On Terror” call fell short of these requirements. In fact, its broadness of interpretation made it open to political exploitation.
Because “War” meant anything – from an unconventional or conventional attack to a nuclear one , even a pre-emptive one became admissible and because “Terror” also embraced anything which the PLO, the Basque ETA, the UNABomber would do, the target could also conveniently move to WMDs and Iraq. Because of its broadness and ambiguity, the attempts to redefine it as “Islamo-Fascist/m” later only made things worse. “Freedom and Democracy” were even offered as ideological alternatives to “Terror”, which being a desperate method that it is, was not an ideology at all. In fact, the terrorists were able to turn the tables on that one to their followers when it claimed that they were for genuine “Freedom and Democracy” and that we were the “terrorists”. From Day One the strategy of “War on Terror” already had us screwed. This, despite the well-intentioned patriotism and bravery of Americans who instinctively rallied to protect their country. So, how do we correct this?
The Need For A Correct Strategy
In crafting the correct strategy in fighting this global unconventional war , we should define the target and the means of defeating it. The strategy should contain:
(1) The differentiating point between the enemy and its potential adherents whose
conditions it wants to exploit.
In this War, Muslims are our best allies. Many of them do not agree to the
organized terrorism espoused by Bin Laden , but out of fear and lack of
organization, and due to Western insecurities and bias, we have failed to
appreciate their talents and tap their strength.
(2) The effective long-term responses to the enemy’s pattern of global guerilla
warfare exploiting a global religion for its ideological base which are:
(a) ideological warfare – Bin Ladenism is an assault on Islam
(b) decentralization of a protracted People’s War vs. Bin Ladenism
The many areas in the world where Muslim communities exist, whether in the
suburbs of London , the Parisian ghettoes or elsewhere are the very sites where a
protracted People’s War against Bin Ladenism should be allowed to prosper.
For every hit-and-run sabotage act by the Bin ladenists in any part of the globe,
there need not always be a conventional US military force response. If Muslims
were allowed to organize to defend their religion against Bin Ladenism,(and
there are indeed substantial Koranic bases for this ) then they could organize too
to protect their local community from terrorists. All that is needed from all
democratic forces, to include the democratic host governments, is to aid them.
We need to look at this struggle as principally a fight between Muslims and Bin
Ladenists , not as the Western world’s fight against wayward Muslims.
The following is an excerpt from a document written by Muslims and veterans from insurgent wars which sums up what I believe is the correct strategy. With permission of the authors, only the foreword is being disclosed.
Doctrine on
People’s War Against Bin Ladenism
This paper is being written in response to the urgent need for a reevaluated, coherent primer for all democratic forces struggling against the growing global threat of Bin Ladenism – a radical misinterpretation of the basic tenets of Islam incorporating failed aspirations of the Arab States in the Middle East, principally, and the welfare and self-identity concerns of Muslims, in general. Although Bin Ladenism traced its roots in the Soviet-Afghanistan War of 1979-88 and culminated in world awareness for its notorious Sept. 11, 2001 attack on US soil, the resulting “War on Terror”campaign and military implementation thereof, initiated by US authorities then affecting the command-and-control structures of its military forces has historically been shown to have shackled the efficiency of its very own forces and could not satisfactorily serve to identify the goals, set the limits and clarify the most effective means of achieving those goals. It will thus be treated independently as a historical reference by this paper . As the document elucidates its guiding principles on three levels: Ideological, Political and Organizational, it does not claim to be a self-limiting Dogma imposed on the various options open in dealing with this worldwide security threat but rather provide the seeds of what it hopes to become an effective strategy in the global fight against Bin Ladenism. As such, the valuable reflection, scrutiny, and inputs of democratic forces , specially those with an understanding of insurgent warfare and of the Islam Faith, are welcome.
How Does the Iraq Conflict Configure in the Corrected Strategic Course?
The Iraq conflict is a fluke in the over-all strategy against Bin Ladenism. It is a distraction and should be treated as it is being treated now: damage-control of the problems the invasion had caused. As of the latest, timelines on the benchmarks of Iraqi government and military preparedness has been admitted by US authorities. The sectarian civil strife expedited by the US invasion and exploited by Bin Ladenists cannot be prolonged by US military occupation. The Iraqi Civil War must resolve itself with the victorious parties identifying themselves in governance as the sovereign power-holders the US would negotiate with in the future. The corrected strategy of People’s War Vs. Bin Ladenism can still be carried out in a post-Civil War Iraq.
What About Afghanistan ?
We had almost lost Afghanistan because of the Iraq misadventure. Currently, combined NATO-US forces are gaining ground. The golden window for implementing the corrected strategy is there.
To answer former Secr. Armitage’s question at the beginning of this Post, “Yes, sir, we have time. We made time.”
Any thoughts evaluating the formation of a new strategy cannot ignore reevaluation of the old one. The reevaluation has been consistent on all levels: The present course on Iraq is the implementation of a wrong strategy. It means the over-all rallying cry which defined the course of action “War on Terror” was being called into question. This does not mean however, that no resolution of the present Iraq conflict is possible as we will learn later.
In the frontlines, The value placed on issuing the correct course of action cannot be underestimated. Victory or defeat – giving the enemy unnecessary advantage and the unnecessary loss of lives of one’s own troops all hang in a balance when the simple order of “Attack!” or “Retreat! “ is given, and although there is often no admission of “retreat” (or cut and run) since troop morale is always kept high, even in the ranks of enemy insurgents, “retreat” is a very valid and correct strategy. The reason a lot of discussion is given to even defining the Commander’s intent is because of the caution exercised in ensuring that the cascade of sub-commands that will follow will really implement the correctly interpreted strategy that will lead to victory.
So the burden for the Commander to spell out the correct course of action is rather great,
but what about “War on Terror” as the strategic course of action?
The Consequences of a Wrong Strategy
The question on “War on Terror” is its broadness. Sure, there was the obvious need not to glorify the terrorists as well as avoid the confusion that could ensue by giving the strategy a religious overtone, so “War on Terror” seemed the safest to use at the time, but, carelessly crafted as it was, did it define the enemy well enough so as not to confuse it with the Moslem world within which it wanted to hide? Also, the enemy, as it had shown in previous patterns of military offensives, was intent on carrying out guerilla warfare on targets of opportunity in the world. In giving out the strategic course, how could the Commander spell out the most effective response to defeat a global unconventional war ? Clearly, the “War On Terror” call fell short of these requirements. In fact, its broadness of interpretation made it open to political exploitation.
Because “War” meant anything – from an unconventional or conventional attack to a nuclear one , even a pre-emptive one became admissible and because “Terror” also embraced anything which the PLO, the Basque ETA, the UNABomber would do, the target could also conveniently move to WMDs and Iraq. Because of its broadness and ambiguity, the attempts to redefine it as “Islamo-Fascist/m” later only made things worse. “Freedom and Democracy” were even offered as ideological alternatives to “Terror”, which being a desperate method that it is, was not an ideology at all. In fact, the terrorists were able to turn the tables on that one to their followers when it claimed that they were for genuine “Freedom and Democracy” and that we were the “terrorists”. From Day One the strategy of “War on Terror” already had us screwed. This, despite the well-intentioned patriotism and bravery of Americans who instinctively rallied to protect their country. So, how do we correct this?
The Need For A Correct Strategy
In crafting the correct strategy in fighting this global unconventional war , we should define the target and the means of defeating it. The strategy should contain:
(1) The differentiating point between the enemy and its potential adherents whose
conditions it wants to exploit.
In this War, Muslims are our best allies. Many of them do not agree to the
organized terrorism espoused by Bin Laden , but out of fear and lack of
organization, and due to Western insecurities and bias, we have failed to
appreciate their talents and tap their strength.
(2) The effective long-term responses to the enemy’s pattern of global guerilla
warfare exploiting a global religion for its ideological base which are:
(a) ideological warfare – Bin Ladenism is an assault on Islam
(b) decentralization of a protracted People’s War vs. Bin Ladenism
The many areas in the world where Muslim communities exist, whether in the
suburbs of London , the Parisian ghettoes or elsewhere are the very sites where a
protracted People’s War against Bin Ladenism should be allowed to prosper.
For every hit-and-run sabotage act by the Bin ladenists in any part of the globe,
there need not always be a conventional US military force response. If Muslims
were allowed to organize to defend their religion against Bin Ladenism,(and
there are indeed substantial Koranic bases for this ) then they could organize too
to protect their local community from terrorists. All that is needed from all
democratic forces, to include the democratic host governments, is to aid them.
We need to look at this struggle as principally a fight between Muslims and Bin
Ladenists , not as the Western world’s fight against wayward Muslims.
The following is an excerpt from a document written by Muslims and veterans from insurgent wars which sums up what I believe is the correct strategy. With permission of the authors, only the foreword is being disclosed.
Doctrine on
People’s War Against Bin Ladenism
This paper is being written in response to the urgent need for a reevaluated, coherent primer for all democratic forces struggling against the growing global threat of Bin Ladenism – a radical misinterpretation of the basic tenets of Islam incorporating failed aspirations of the Arab States in the Middle East, principally, and the welfare and self-identity concerns of Muslims, in general. Although Bin Ladenism traced its roots in the Soviet-Afghanistan War of 1979-88 and culminated in world awareness for its notorious Sept. 11, 2001 attack on US soil, the resulting “War on Terror”campaign and military implementation thereof, initiated by US authorities then affecting the command-and-control structures of its military forces has historically been shown to have shackled the efficiency of its very own forces and could not satisfactorily serve to identify the goals, set the limits and clarify the most effective means of achieving those goals. It will thus be treated independently as a historical reference by this paper . As the document elucidates its guiding principles on three levels: Ideological, Political and Organizational, it does not claim to be a self-limiting Dogma imposed on the various options open in dealing with this worldwide security threat but rather provide the seeds of what it hopes to become an effective strategy in the global fight against Bin Ladenism. As such, the valuable reflection, scrutiny, and inputs of democratic forces , specially those with an understanding of insurgent warfare and of the Islam Faith, are welcome.
How Does the Iraq Conflict Configure in the Corrected Strategic Course?
The Iraq conflict is a fluke in the over-all strategy against Bin Ladenism. It is a distraction and should be treated as it is being treated now: damage-control of the problems the invasion had caused. As of the latest, timelines on the benchmarks of Iraqi government and military preparedness has been admitted by US authorities. The sectarian civil strife expedited by the US invasion and exploited by Bin Ladenists cannot be prolonged by US military occupation. The Iraqi Civil War must resolve itself with the victorious parties identifying themselves in governance as the sovereign power-holders the US would negotiate with in the future. The corrected strategy of People’s War Vs. Bin Ladenism can still be carried out in a post-Civil War Iraq.
What About Afghanistan ?
We had almost lost Afghanistan because of the Iraq misadventure. Currently, combined NATO-US forces are gaining ground. The golden window for implementing the corrected strategy is there.
To answer former Secr. Armitage’s question at the beginning of this Post, “Yes, sir, we have time. We made time.”
